4/18/2019: Change 1 to NVIC 03-14, “Guidelines for Approval of Training Courses and Programs”

The udpate to this NVIC provides additional course content guidance to merchant mariner training organizations that offer meteorology, ship handling, and bridge resource management courses.


12/26/2018: Third party oversight – one year after the commandant’s Final Action Memo on the El Faro sinking

On Dec. 22, 2017, the commandant of the Coast Guard released the Final Action Memo for the Report of the Marine Board of Investigation into the sinking of the steam ship El Faro and the loss of its 33 crewmembers. In the FAM, the commandant signaled the Coast Guard’s commitment to making improvements to prevent similar marine casualties. This post highlights the actions taken to address gaps in third party oversight and the Alternate Compliance Program in the year since the FAM was released.


10/10/2018: Coast Guard releases Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 02-95, Change 3 – The Alternate Compliance Program

NVIC 02-95, Change 3, incorporates various policies and related provisions consistent with the Commandant’s Final Action Memo on the sinking of the S.S. El Faro.


10/1/2018: Remembering El Faro

Today, we mark the somber anniversary of the sinking of the SS El Faro and the loss of the 33 men and women on board on October 1, 2015. It is appropriate to pause and reflect on this tragic and preventable accident, and challenge ourselves to ensure we are all taking action needed to prevent future casualties.


4/19/2018: U.S. Flag interpretations on the ISM Code

This post discusses a recently released Mission Management System Work Instruction regarding the U.S. Flag Interpretations on the ISM Code to provide supplemental flag state guidance regarding the development, implementation, and verification of safety management systems on U.S. Flag vessels. This work instruction also includes specific provisions to assist in assessing risks and developing contingency plans for emergency shipboard situations, and is designed to be used in conjunction with CVC-WI-003, USCG Oversight of Safety Management Systems on U.S. Flag Vessels. Industry stakeholders and Recognized Organizations are encouraged to reference this guidance when developing, implementing, and verifying SMSs in order to promote a strong safety culture throughout the U.S. flag fleet.


4/4/2018: Marine Safety Alert 04/18 – Operation of main propulsion and essential auxiliary machinery

This alert is issued to inform operators of the role that the main propulsion lube oil system was found to have played in the EL FARO casualty. This alert also recommends that operators, especially ship engineers, review the operational procedures and limitations of vital propulsion machinery, and verify compliance with SOLAS, Classification Society and regulatory standards.


2/1/2018: Summary of Congressional testimony regarding El Faro reports

Rear Admiral John Nadeau, assistant commandant for prevention policy, testified Jan. 30, 2018, before the House Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation Subcommittee, during a hearing titled, “Examination of Reports on the El Faro Marine Casualty.” Testifying alongside Nadeau were the Hon. Earl Weener, board member, National Transportation Safety Board, and Mr. Brian Curtis, with NTSB’s Office of Marine Safety.


1/29/2018: Adm. Nadeau to testify before Congress on El Faro final action memo

Rear Admiral John Nadeau, assistant commandant for prevention policy, will testify before the House Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation Subcommittee Jan. 30, 2018, in a hearing titled, “Examination of reports on the El Faro marine casualty.”


12/21/2017: Coast Guard releases Final Action Memo regarding S.S. El Faro sinking and loss of 33 crewmembers

In the Final Action Memo, Adm. Zukunft approves the findings of fact, analysis, and conclusions detailed in the Marine Board of Investigation’s Report of Investigation, essentially marking it as the official Coast Guard position on the cause of the marine casualty.


10/1/2017: Coast Guard releases Report of Investigation into loss of 33 mariners and U.S. cargo ship, El Faro

The MBI concluded that the primary cause of the casualty was the decision to navigate El Faro too close to the path of Hurricane Joaquin. As the MBI expanded the investigation to explore other contributing factors, it uncovered evidence of an ineffective safety management system within the operating company, and failures by both the Coast Guard delegated representative and the Coast Guard itself to provide effective oversight of the vessel’s compliance with safety regulations.


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